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Abstract 
 
Korea was hit hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the foreign bank deleveraging 
channel coming prominently into play. The global financial crisis demonstrated that a sharp 
deleveraging can be transmitted to emerging markets through the bank lending channel to a 
slowdown in credit growth. The analysis finds that a sharp decline in external funding led to 
relatively modest decline in domestic credit by Korean banks, due to concerted policy efforts by 
the government in 2008. Impulse responses from a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) model calibrated to Korea shows that it appears better prepared to handle such shocks 
relative to 2008. Indeed, Korea is much more resilient to such shocks due to the efforts by the 
authorities, which has led to the strengthening of external buffers, such as higher foreign 
exchange reserves and bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
1.      International banks constituted a key channel of transmission of financial stress 
during the global financial crisis (GFC). Indeed, the collapse in capital flows to emerging 
markets in the aftermath of the crisis was dominated by the precipitous fall in cross-border 
bank loans, as linkages with international banks played a major role in the transmission of 
the crisis (April 2009 World Economic Outlook). In the second half of 2011, as the crisis 
in Europe deepened and pressures on European banks intensified, deleveraging ensued in 
response to the European Banking Authority’s higher targets on bank capital adequacy 
ratios. So far, the evidence suggests it has been relatively orderly and gradual. The funding 
strains eased due to the European Central Bank’s Long-Term Refinancing Operations 
(LTRO) and resulted in re-leveraging by European banks in the first quarter of 2012. 
2.      Looking ahead, the possibility of a pull back resulting from a further 
intensification of the euro zone crisis cannot be ruled out. As the April 2012 Global 
Financial Stability Report (GFSR) pointed out, while some deleveraging by European 
banks is inevitable and even desirable, it is crucial to try to avoid synchronized and large 
scale shrinkage of balance sheets which would have serious implications for economic 
activity and financial markets within Europe and elsewhere.  
3.      This paper contributes to the emerging literature on the transmission to the real 
economy of the external funding shock to bank balance sheets during the GFC. We focus 
specifically on Korea as it is one of the economies in Asia that is significantly exposed to 
foreign bank funding risks as it relies on wholesale funding, though considerably less than 
in the past. This dependence resulted in serious knock-on effects during the 2008 crisis. 
This paper assesses whether the credit supply response in Korea to deleveraging by foreign 
banks was different than in other economies.  
4.      This paper asks the following questions: 
• What is the nature of Korea’s linkages to international banks, and how have they 
evolved over time? 
• How and to what extent did the freeze in external funding during the 2008 crisis 
affect Korean economy and the banks? 
• Has the sensitivity to foreign bank inflows changed in the post-2008 period? 
5.      We use two approaches to analyze the effect of foreign bank deleveraging on 
Korea: impulse response functions from a DSGE) model with a full-fledged banking sector 
and bank-level panel regressions.  
6.      The paper is structured as follows: the next section explores the links between 
foreign banks and Korea by comparing the extent and nature of reliance on foreign bank 
funding within Asia. Section III presents a DSGE model that incorporates a fully fledged 
banking sector to trace the spillovers from foreign bank deleveraging on output and 
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external variables. It provides a rich description of the setup of the model and also 
compares the differences in responses before and after the global financial crisis. Section 
IV  presents the panel regression framework and results. Section V concludes.  
II.   KOREA’S LINKAGES TO INTERNATIONAL BANKS: STYLIZED FACTS 
7.      Foreign bank claims on Korea are 
sizeable, both relative to the size of the 
economy and compared with other countries in 
the region. The stock of consolidated claims of 
foreign banks on Korea stood at around 
US$300 billion at end-March 2012 which 
amounts to about 25 percent of GDP. Around 
half of these claims are vis-à-vis European 
banks, though the mitigating factor is that the 
bulk of European claims are to United 
Kingdom banks as the effect of deleveraging is 
expected to be more muted in case of U.K. 
banks (Figure 1). As a result of deleveraging 
since 2008, the outstanding claims of euro area 
banks have fallen sharply from their peak of 
US$110 billion in 2008 to only US$38 billion, 
respectively, at end-March 2012. The 
deleveraging was offset to some extent by U.S. 
and Japanese banks which increased their 
outstanding claims to US$97 billion and 
US$48 billion, respectively at end-March 2012. 
Consolidated claims include both cross-border 
lending and credit extended by the local 
subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks. 
Compared with other countries in the region, 
Korea relies heavily on funding from foreign 
banks along with Australia, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, and Taiwan Province of China 
(Figure 2).  
 
8.      Credit from foreign banks to Korea 
flows to both the banking system and the non-
bank private sector. The Korean banking 
sector is reliant on wholesale funding, 
including from abroad, as around 25 percent 
of foreign claims outstanding (US$85 billion) 
were vis-à-vis the banks at end-March 2012 
(Figure 3). While the dependence on wholesale funding has declined relative to 2008, 
given the large outstanding amounts, further deleveraging clearly still poses a risk. A 
substantial portion of foreign bank credit is extended directly to the Korean non-bank 
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Figure 1. Korea: Stock of Consolidated Foreign 
Claims to Euro Area, U.K., U.S., and Japan Banks 
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (BIS); and IMF staff calculations.
Note: Claims are on immediate borrower basis.  
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Figure 3. Korea: Stock of Consolidated Foreign 
Claims by Sector
(In billions of U.S. dollars)
Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Note: Claims are on ultimate risk basis.  
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Figure 2. Consolidated Foreign Claims of European 
and U.S. Banks on Selected Asian Economies 1/ 
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private sector (around 50 percent of credit outstanding in Q1 2012), and this share has 
been increasing over time. There is anecdotal evidence that suggests that foreign banks, 
particularly European banks, have been particularly active in providing trade finance, 
syndicated loans, and project finance.  
9.      Foreign banks pulled back from Korea in the second half of 2011, though much 
less than during the global financial crisis. As the euro area crisis intensified in August–
September 2011, global banks started to pare back assets globally, including from Korea. 
Outstanding claims of European banks on Korea fell by around 15 percent and 7 percent 
(quarter on quarter) in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2011, respectively.2 Overall, the 
retrenchment was less than during 2008, as 
data from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) suggest a withdrawal of 
around US$40 billion in the second half of 
2011, compared with a decline of 
US$100 billion in 2008. Among euro area 
banks, the pullback in the second half of 
2011 was the sharpest by French banks, 
which reduced claims by half. Italian and 
Spanish banks also retrenched though the 
amounts outstanding are much smaller than for French banks. Deleveraging was not 
limited to banks from the euro area as U.S. banks and U.K. banks also reduced claims on 
Korea during this episode. However, other Asian banks, in particular Japanese banks, 
stepped in to partially fill the gap. 
III.   EFFECT OF FOREIGN BANK DELEVERAGING ON KOREA: EVIDENCE FROM A DSGE 
MODEL 
10.      The spillovers from foreign bank deleveraging are analyzed in an open economy 
New Keynesian DSGE model. The DSGE model used is a small open economy version of 
Iacoviello (2011), which incorporates the banking sector as a key channel of transmission 
through which repayment shocks spillover to the economy. In this paper, we extend the 
Iacoviello (2011) model into a small open economy model, which is thus very closely 
related to that of Dao and Kang (2012), who extend  Iacoviello (2011) into a two-country 
model. To consider the impact of global bank deleveraging, domestic banks in a small 
economy are assumed to borrow from global banks. The model follows the standard set-up 
of the New Keynesian DSGE model, with attributes such as price (wage) stickiness and 
                                                 
2 The numbers on the extent of deleveraging are based on the BIS’s consolidated banking statistics and are 
not exchange rate adjusted. During a period of global financial stress with local currencies in emerging Asia 
depreciating against the U.S. dollar, these statistics will overestimate the extent of reduction of claims (in 
U.S. dollar terms). However, while the magnitudes include this valuation effect, the main takeaway is that 
deleveraging by European banks did affect Korea in the second half of 2011. 
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some adjustment costs. The model is calibrated to the characteristics of the Korean 
economy. 
A.   Model Description 
Households 
 
11.      Households are divided into two types, patient households and impatient 
households. The differences between them stem from the fact that the discount factor of 
patient households, ߚ௣, is higher than that of impatient households, ߚ௜. That is, patient 
households become depositors due to their higher discount factor, while impatient 
households become borrowers as their discount factor is lower. 
12.      Patient households supply labor ௣ܰ,௧ to labor unions and receive nominal wage ௣ܹ,௧௨ . 
They deposit ܦ௣,௧ with domestic banks and receive ܴ௣,௧ܦ௣,௧ in the next period. ܴ௣,௧ is the 
gross rate of interest paid on deposits. Patient households purchase final consumption 
goods ܥ௣,௧ at the price of ஼ܲ,௧ from retailers. They purchase housing ܪ௣,௧ at the price of ܳு,௧ 
from housing producers and sell the depreciated housing ሺ1 െ ߜுሻܪ௣,௧ back to the housing 
producers in the next period. They hold foreign assets ܤ௣,௧, which yields a gross rate of 
return of ܴ௣,௧ி . Patient households have utility from consumption, housing and foreign 
assets and disutility from work. Their utility maximization problem is then given by :  
 
max஼೛,೟,  ு೛,೟, ே೛,೟, ஽೛,೟, ஻೛,೟ ܧ௧෍ߚ௣௧ ቈln ܥ௣,௧ ൅ ݆௣ lnܪ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ߬௣ ln൫1 െ ௣ܰ,௧൯ ൅ ߦ௣ ln
ܵ௧ܤ௣,௧
஼ܲ,௧
቉
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
                s. t.     ஼ܲ,௧ܥ௣,௧ ൅ ܳு,௧ܪ௣,௧ ൅ ܦ௣,௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܤ௣,௧ ൌ ௣ܹ,௧௨ ௣ܰ,௧ ൅   
                              ܳு,௧ሺ1 െ ߜுሻܪ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ܴ௣,௧ିଵܦ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ܵ௧ܴ௣,௧ିଵி ܤ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ܦ݅ݒ௣,௧                 
 
where ܦ݅ݒ௣,௧ is the dividends from wholesalers and labor unions to patient households, ܵ௧ 
exchange rate,  ݆௣, ߬௣ and ߦ௣ parameters showing the preferences of patient households for  
housing, working and foreign assets, respectively, and ߜு the housing depreciation rate. 
 
13.      Impatient households supply labor ௜ܰ,௧ to labor unions and receive nominal wage 
௜ܹ,௧௨ .  They borrow ܮ௜,௧ from domestic banks and pay ܴ௜,௧ܮ௜,௧ in the next period with ܴ௜,௧ 
being the gross rate of interest charged on impatient household borrowing. The amount of 
impatient households’ borrowing is constrained by the value of their housing. Impatient 
households purchase final consumption goods ܥ௜,௧ at the price of ஼ܲ,௧ from retailers. They 
trade their housing ܪ௜,௧ with the housing producers in the same way as patient households. 
Impatient households have utility from consumption and housing and disutility from 
working. The utility maximization problem of impatient households is then given by :  
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max஼೔,೟,   ு೔,೟,  ே೔,೟,    ௅೔,೟ ܧ௧෍ߚ௜௧ൣln ܥ௜,௧ ൅ ݆௜ lnܪ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߬௜ ln൫1 െ ௜ܰ,௧൯൧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
s. t.     ஼ܲ,௧ܥ௜,௧ ൅ ܳு,௧ܪ௜,௧ ൅ ܴ௜,௧ିଵܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൌ 
௜ܹ,௧௨ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ܳு,௧ሺ1 െ ߜுሻܪ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܮ௜,௧ ൅ ܦ݅ݒ௜,௧                                 ܴ௜,௧ܮ௜,௧ ൑ ݉௜ܳு,௧ାଵሺ1 െ ߜுሻܪ௜,௧                                                   
 
where ܦ݅ݒ௜,௧  is dividends from labor unions to the impatient households, ݆௜  and ߬௜ 
parameters showing the preferences of impatient households for housing and working, and ݉௜ the ratio of borrowing to the value of their housing. 
 
Entrepreneurs 
 
14.      Entrepreneurs rent capital ܭ௧ିଵ to firms and receive rental revenues ܴ௧௄ܭ௧ିଵ with ܴ௧௄ being the rate of return on capital. Entrepreneurs borrow ܮ௘,௧ from domestic banks and 
pay ܴ௘,௧ାଵܮ௘,௧ in the next period. ܴ௘,௧ is the gross interest rates charged for entrepreneur 
borrowing, and the amount of their borrowing is constrained by the value of capital. 
Entrepreneurs purchase capital from capital producers at the price of ܳ௄,௧ and sell the 
depreciated capital ሺ1 െ ߜ௄ሻܭ௧ back to capital producers in the next period. Entrepreneurs 
purchase final consumption goods ܥ௘,௧ at the price of ஼ܲ,௧ from retailers. The consumption 
utility maximization problem of entrepreneurs is then given by :  
max஼೐,೟,    ௄೟,   ௅೐,೟ ܧ௧෍ߚ௘௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
ln  ܥ௘,௧ 
s. t.     ஼ܲ,௧ܥ௘,௧ ൅ ܴ௘,௧ܮ௘,௧ିଵ ൅ ܳ௄,௧ܭ௧ ൌ ܮ௘,௧ ൅ ൣܴ௧௄ ൅ ܳ௄,௧ሺ1 െ ߜ௄ሻ൧ܭ௧ିଵ                 ܴ௘,௧ାଵܮ௘,௧ ൑ ݉௘ܳ௄,௧ାଵܭ௧ሺ1 െ ߜ௄ሻ                                                            
 
where ߚ௘  is the discount factor of entrepreneurs, ߜ௄  the rate of capital depreciation, and  ݉௘ the ratio of borrowing to the value of their capital.  
 
Domestic banks 
 
15.      The domestic banks have two outside sources of funding, namely, deposits from 
patient households and the borrowing from foreign banks, ܮி,௧.  The gross rate of interest 
on their foreign borrowings is ܴ௕,௧ி . Domestic banks extend loans to impatient households 
and entrepreneurs. Whenever they change their funding and lending structures, they bear 
adjustment costs.  
16.      Domestic banks have two constraints with regards to funding. One is a net worth 
constraint and the other a foreign borrowing constraint. The net worth constraint implies 
that the amount of their outside funding should be less than some fraction of their lending. 
Put differently, the net worth should be greater than some fraction of lending. The foreign 
borrowing constraint implies that their foreign borrowing should be lower than some 
fraction of differences between lending and deposits.  
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17.      Domestic banks purchase the final consumption goods ܥ௕,௧ at the price of ஼ܲ,௧ from 
retailers. The consumption utility maximization problem is then given by : 
                           max                  ஼್,೟,   ஽೛,೟,   ௅೔,೟,   ௅೐,೟,   ௅ಷ,೟ ܧ௧෍ߚ௕௧݈݊ܥ௕,௧         
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
         s. t.    ஼ܲ,௧ܥ௕,௧ ൅ ܴ௣,௧ିଵܦ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ܮ௜,௧ ൅ ܮ௘,௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܴ௕,௧ିଵி ܮி,௧ିଵ ൅ ߶஽ು2 ൫ܦ௣,௧ െ ܦ௣,௧ିଵ൯
ଶ 
                       ൅߶௅೔2 ൫ܮ௜,௧ െ ܮ௜,௧ିଵ൯
ଶ ൅ ߶௅೐2 ൫ܮ௘,௧ െ ܮ௘,௧ିଵ൯
ଶ ൅ ߶௅ಷ2 ൫ܵ௧ܮி,௧ െ ܵ௧ିଵܮி,௧ିଵ൯
ଶ
 
                                      ൌ ܦ௣,௧ ൅ ܴ௘,௧ܮ௘,௧ିଵ ൅ ܴ௜,௧ିଵܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܵ௧ܮி,௧             ܦ௣,௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܮி,௧ ൑ ߛ௘ܮ௘,௧ ൅ ߛ௜ܮ௜,௧                                                                                           ܵ௧ܴி,௧ܮி,௧ ൑ ݉௕ሺܮ௜,௧ ൅ ܮ௘,௧ െ ܦ௣,௧ሻ                                                                             
 
where ߚ௕ is the discount factor of domestic banks, ߶஽ು, ߶௅೔, ߶௅೐ and ߶௅ಷ the parameters 
showing the adjustment costs occurring when domestic banks change their deposits, 
impatient household lending, entrepreneur lending and foreign borrowing, respectively, ߛ௜ 
and ߛ௘ their  net worth constraint with respect to impatient household lending and 
entrepreneur lending, respectively, and ݉௕ the ratio of foreign borrowing to differences 
between lending and deposits. 
 
Capital/housing producers 
 
18.      Capital producers sell capital ܭ௧ to entrepreneurs. They use the intermediate 
investment goods  ܫ௄,௧  at the price of ூ಼ܲ,௧ and the depreciated capital ሺ1 െ ߜ௄ሻܭ௧ିଵ at the 
proce of  ܳ௄,௧ to produce capital.  These investment goods and depreciated capital are 
purchased from retailers and entrepreneurs, respectively. The profit maximization of capital 
producers is then given by :   
 
max௄೟,  ூ಼,೟ ܧ௧෍ߚ௣௟
ݑᇱ൫ܥ௣,௧ା௟൯
ݑᇱ൫ܥ௣,௧൯ ൣܳ௄,௧ା௟ܭ௧ା௟ െܳ௄,௧ା௟ሺ1 െ ߜ௄ሻܭ௧ା௟ିଵ െ ூ಼ܲ,௧ା௟ܫ௄,௧ା௟൧
ஶ
௟ୀ଴
 
          s. t.    ܭ௧ା௟ ൌ   ሺ1 െ ߜ௞ሻܭ௧ା௟ିଵ ൅ ൥1 െ ߶ூೖ2 ቆ
ܫ௄,௧ା௟
ܫ௄,௧ା௟ିଵ െ 1ቇ
ଶ
൩ ܫ௄,௧ା௟          
 
where ݑᇱ൫ܥ௣,௧൯ is the marginal utility of patient household consumption, ߶ூೖ the parameter 
representing the adjustment costs of transforming investment goods into capital.  
Housing producers produce housing and sell it to households. The profit maximization 
problem of the housing producers is the same as that of the capital producers. 
 
Firms 
 
19.      Firms rent capital from entrepreneurs and hire labor from labor packers. ܴ௧௄, ௣ܹ,௧ 
and ௜ܹ,௧ are the prices that firms pay for capital, patient household labor and impatient 
household labor, respectively. Using these production factors, firms produce intermediate 
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goods ௧ܻ through the Cobb-Douglas production function and sell these goods to 
wholesalers at the price of ஽ܲ,௧ఠ . The profit maximization problem of firms is given by :  
 max௄೟షభ,  ே೛,೟,   ே೔,೟ ஽ܲ,௧ఠ ௧ܻ െ ܴ௧௄ܭ௧ିଵ െ ௣ܹ,௧ ௣ܰ,௧ െ ௜ܹ,௧ ௜ܰ,௧ s. t.      ௧ܻ
ൌ ܣ௧ሺܭ௧ିଵሻఈ൫ ௣ܰ,௧൯ሺଵିఝሻሺଵିఈሻ൫ ௜ܰ,௧൯ఝሺଵିఈሻ                          ሺ26ሻ 
 
where ߙ  is the capital income shares and ߮  the labor income shares of impatient 
households, and ܣ௧ the variable showing their technology level.  
 
Wholesalers and retailers 
 
20.      In order for the model to exhibit price stickiness, we introduce wholesalers and 
retailers.3 Wholesalers purchase intermediate goods, and differentiate them and finally sell 
them to retailers. Differentiation of intermediation goods gives wholesalers the power of 
setting their prices. Wholesalers decide the optimal prices with indexation, following Calvo 
(1983). Domestic wholesalers and imported goods wholesalers are distinct in that they 
purchase either domestic intermediate goods or foreign intermediate goods.  
21.      Retailers purchase differentiated goods, and combine and sell them to households, 
entrepreneurs, domestic banks, capital producers and housing producers. The combined 
goods sold to households, entrepreneurs and domestic banks become final consumption 
goods, while the combined goods sold to capital producers and housing producers become 
capital investment goods and housing investment goods, respectively.  
 
Labor unions and labor packers 
 
22.      To give the model wage stickiness, labor unions and labor packers are introduced. 
Labor unions hires labor from households, and differentiate and supply it to labor packers. 
Similar to wholesalers, labor unions can set the optimal wages during differentiation via 
Calvo (1983), with indexation. Labor packers hire differentiated labor, and combine and 
supply it to firms.4 
Foreign sector 
 
23.      Since we assume that the economy under consideration is a small open economy, 
the foreign sector is so large that the domestic sector cannot affect the foreign sector, but 
the foreign sector can affect the domestic sector. The foreign sector is interconnected with 
the domestic sector in two ways. Firstly, firms export their intermediate goods to foreign 
wholesalers, while domestic imported good wholesalers import foreign intermediate goods. 
                                                 
3 To see how the optimal prices are determined by wholesalers and retailers, please refer to Bernanke et al 
(1999), Iacoviello (2005) etc.  
4 To see how the optimal wages are determined, refer to Smet and Wouters (2007). 
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Secondly, domestic banks borrow from foreign banks, and patient households save their 
foreign assets and place them with foreign banks.  
24.      Net exports and net capital flows between the domestic and foreign sectors should 
cancel out, and so the following equality always holds : 
 
஽ܲ,௧ఠ ܧܺ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܴ௣,௧ିଵி ܤ௣,௧ିଵ ൅ ܵ௧ܮி,௧ ൌ ܵ௧ ிܲ,௧ఠ ܫܯ௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܤ௣,௧ ൅ ܵ௧ܴ௕,௧ିଵி ܮி,௧ିଵ     
 
where ܧܺ௧ and ܫܯ௧ represent exports and imports, and ஽ܲ,௧ఠ  and ிܲ,௧ఠ  are the respective prices 
of exports and imports. 
 
 Monetary Policy 
 
25.      The central bank set the interest rates of deposits according to the Taylor rule as 
follows : 
ܴ௣,௧ ൌ ܴ௣,௧ିଵఘೃ೛ ቈܴ௣ ൬ ௧ܻܻ൰
ణೊ ൬ ஼ܲ,௧
஼ܲ
൰ణ೛቉
ଵିఘೃ೛
                         
 
where ߩோ೛ the smoothing parameter,  ߴ௒ and  ߴ௉ the responses of the central bank to output 
and price, respectively, and ܴ௣, ܻ  and   ஼ܲ  the steady-state values of ܴ௣,௧ , ௧ܻ  and  ஼ܲ,௧ , 
respectively. 
 
B.   Impulse Responses 
 
26.      The model is used to trace out the effects on the economy when global banks 
deleverage and thereby reduce their credit supply to the domestic economy. Figure 5 below 
show the impulse responses to such a negative foreign credit supply shock. The drop in 
foreign borrowing reduces the size of domestic bank balance sheets. Thus, domestic banks 
cut their lending to entrepreneurs, who in turn reduce their investment, leading to a decline 
in output. Also, when global credit supply to the small open economy decreases, the 
exchange rate depreciates, leading to an increase in imported goods prices, which results in 
a higher overall price level. However, exchange rate depreciation boosts exports, which 
offsets the decline in output to some extent. 
27.      To see the changes in response of the Korean economy at around the time of the 
global financial crisis, we consider two states: pre-GFC and post-GFC. The main 
differences between these two states are as follows. Firstly, the external debt-to-GDP ratio 
has decreased markedly since the crisis, while foreign reserves have increased. Secondly, 
both household and corporate debt-to-GDP ratios have risen, which has boosted the overall 
level of domestic liabilities in Korea. Lastly, the ratio of exports and imports to GDP has 
increased, so that the Korean economy has become more dependent on the world economy. 
The ratios of the actual data in Table 1 demonstrate these changes in Korean economy.  
28.      The changes in Korea at around the time of the GFC, as mentioned above, are also 
reflected in the steady-state of the DSGE model. The ratios of the steady-state in Table 1 
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are well matched with those of the actual data in both the pre- and the post-GFC states. 
Different steady-state values in the pre- and post-GFC states are obtained by applying a 
different parameterization to each state. More specifically, the parameters affecting the 
levels of debt and trade in the steady-state have different values depending upon the state. 
For example, ݉௕ is a very important parameter in deciding the level of external debt––the 
higher ݉௕ is, the higher the level of external debt. Considering that the level of external 
debt has gone down since the crisis, we assign a lower value to ݉௕ in the post-GFC state. 
Main parameters which have different values in the pre- and post-GFC state are 
summarized in Table 2.  
Table 1. Ratios of Liabilities and Trade to GDP 
 
Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
Steady-State 2008 data Steady-State 2011 data 
Household Debt/Nominal GDP 2.65 2.86 2.94 3.00 
Corporate Debt/Nominal GDP 2.56 2.59 2.69 2.69 
Foreign Debt/Nominal GDP 1.33 1.34 1.19 1.19 
Foreign Reserves*/Nominal 
GDP 
0.99 1.02 1.09 1.09 
Real Export/Real GDP 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.46 
Real Import/Real GDP 0.40 0.34 0.45 0.37 
 
* Foreign reserves correspond to Foreign Assets in the model 
Table 2. Parameter Values 
Parameter Pre-GFC Post-GFC 
ߚ௣ 0.9870 0.9910 
݉௜ 0.8400 0.8510 
݉௘ 0.5800 0.5900 
݉௕ 0.6400 0.5940 
߱* 0.6000 0.5500 
 
* The ratio of domestic goods to the sum of domestic goods and imported goods 
 
29.      The dotted line and the solid line in Figure 5 represent the impulse responses of the 
Korean economy to negative foreign borrowing shocks in the pre-GFC and the post-GFC 
states, respectively. Although there are no large quantitative differences in the drops in 
domestic variables such as consumption and investment between the two states, it is 
noteworthy that the responsiveness of external variables including foreign assets and the 
exchange rate has become less sensitive in the post-GFC state. These results show that the 
economy has become more resilient to such shocks. This increased resilience could be 
explained by the changes in the liability structure in Korea since the crisis. Korea’s external 
debt-to-GDP ratio has declined, while its foreign reserves have increased. This improved 
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external liability structure may limit the impact of reduced foreign borrowing shocks on 
external variables in the post-crisis period. However, increased external stability does not 
lead into improved domestic stability, as the impulse responses of the domestic variables 
are almost the same across the two states. This result may be because higher domestic 
liability level since the crisis hinders the transmission of external stability to domestic 
stability.  
30.      Table 3 shows the variance of the impulse responses in the pre and post-GFC states. 
As we can infer from Figure 5, the volatility of many external variables such as foreign 
assets, exports and exchange rates drop sharply after the crisis. However, the volatility of 
domestic variables does not change very much around the time of the crisis, although there 
are slight increases in the volatility of consumption, entrepreneurial lending and domestic 
goods prices. 
Table 3. Variance of Impulse Responses 
 Pre-Crisis (A) Post-Crisis (B) Ratio (B/A) 
Output    3.81    2.73 0.72 
Consumption  22.69  22.80 1.01 
Capital Investment 169.39 166.10 0.98 
Entrepreneur Lending  11.45  12.27 1.07 
Foreign Asset 514.60 410.90 0.80 
Foreign Borrowing Interest 
Rate 
 12.48  16.84 1.35 
Export  12.59    8.30 0.66 
Import  43.90  35.79 0.82 
Exchange Rate   1.94   1.32 0.68 
Total Price   0.17   0.18 1.04 
Domestic Goods Price    0.17   0.19 1.07 
Imported Goods Price   0.37   0.29 0.78 
 
Note : 200 impulse periods are used for computation, and variances are standardized by their 
own steady-state values. 
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Figure 5. Impulse Responses to Negative Foreign Borrowing Shocks 
 
 
Notes:  
1. The y-axis measures the percentage deviation from the steady state. 
2.                       Post-GFC,                      Pre-GFC 
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IV.   THE TRANSMISSION OF THE 2008 CRISIS TO KOREAN BANKS: REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 
31.      This section empirically analyzes the extent to which a large retrenchment by 
foreign banks has the potential to lead to knock-on effects on Korean banks and domestic 
credit supply. Financial stress could transmit to the real economy in a number of ways. A 
credit crunch could arise from a withdrawal of foreign wholesale funding to the domestic 
banking sector or through a direct reduction in foreign credit to the non-bank private 
sector (which is fairly substantial in the case of Korea).  
32.      We examine the last episode during 
which there was a dramatic retrenchment by 
foreign banks. In 2008—a year that 
encompassed both the Bear Stearns episode 
and Lehman Brothers bankruptcy—global 
banks heavily pared back foreign assets 
across the world. Therefore, the global 
financial crisis provides a natural experiment 
to test the responsiveness of domestic credit 
to shocks to external funding.  
33.      The recent literature has found that 
international banks have played a significant role in transmitting the global financial crisis 
to emerging markets. A closely related paper by Aiyar and Jain-Chandra (2012 a) analyzes 
Asia’s reliance on European banks, and the extent to which a large retrenchment by 
European banks could spill over to the real economy and lead to a reduction in credit 
supply in Asia. It finds that the impact on credit supply from a shock in external funding 
in a broad sample of recipient economies was substantial; however, while the credit 
supply response in Asia was also significant, it was about half the size of the response in 
other regions due to the strength of policy buffers and sound balance sheets.  
34.      As is well established, during the global financial crisis, the Korean banking 
system faced a severe shock to external funding. To illustrate this, Figure 6 shows the 
quarterly change in exchange rate adjusted locational cross border claims of BIS reporting 
banks on Korea (this includes only cross border lending but the advantage is that it is 
exchange rate adjusted, as opposed to the consolidated banking statistics described in the 
last section). Cross border claims on Korea fell by more than US$70 billion between 2008 
Q2 and 2009 Q1. This figure exceeds US$85 billion once local claims by foreign banks 
are factored in. This constituted a sudden stop as banks were unable to rollover their short-
term debt, putting severe stress on the foreign exchange (FX) market. The sharp capital 
outflows also led to the equity market declining by around 35 percent in a span of a few 
months. As Figure 4 shows, the bulk of this retrenchment was attributable to bank 
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deleveraging by European banks, despite the fact that Europe was not the epicenter of the 
2008 crisis.5  
35.      The decline in external liabilities was broad based during the global financial 
crisis. It was not the case that external funding to foreign bank branches was pulled back 
more than funding to domestic Korean 
banks. As the international interbank 
markets froze, global banks activated 
the internal (i.e., within a given 
banking group) capital market channel 
and reduced funding to affiliates in 
emerging markets, including Korea, to 
buffer the balance sheet of the head 
office. However, domestically owned 
banks were also badly hit as they relied 
on external capital markets to fund 
local activities. Figure 7 is based on 
regulatory bank-level data from the Bank of Korea and includes domestic banks and 
foreign bank branches by country of origin. During the global financial crisis, the 
retrenchment of external funding to Korean domestic banks was around 25 percent, 
roughly in line with the deleveraging vis-à-vis U.K. bank branches operating in Korea, 
whereas other European banks pulled back more sharply from their branches in Korea. 
During this period, in line with the BIS data, Japanese banks increased their claims on 
Korean banks to provide a small offset.  
 
Data and regressions 
 
36.      We use an extensive bank-level database from the BOK to analyze the impact of 
an external funding shock on the provision of credit by banks. The sample comprises 41 
banks operating in Korea, of which 13 are domestic banks, while 28 are foreign bank 
branches. Foreign bank branches are affiliates of international banks domiciled in a 
number of countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe excluding the 
United Kingdom, Japan, and others. The data are based on bank balance sheets, from the 
first quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2011. 
37.      Table 4 shows the summary statistics for this sample of banks. The main variables 
of interest are loans to the domestic economy, divided into loans to companies and loans 
to households, and external liabilities of banks. As noted above, the external funding 
                                                 
5 While the United States is another important source country for Korea, the U.S. foreign claims data from the 
BIS have a serious structural break. In late 2008, the surviving stand-alone investment banks, including 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, were transformed into bank holding companies and included for the 
first time in the BIS sample. As a result, the U.S. claims series shows a sharp increase in early 2009. 
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shock translated into a sharp reduction in external liabilities for both domestic banks and 
foreign bank branches. The growth rate of domestic lending slowed down from the pre-
crisis to the crisis period. While the same trend is witnessed for foreign bank branches, 
their importance in domestic lending is limited, with domestic banks accounting for 
96 percent of total domestic loans. Instead, foreign bank branches in Korea typically focus 
on raising FX funds, including from their headquarters, and providing them to domestic 
banks through the swap market, and are not usually a provider of domestic credit.  
 
 
 
Panel regressions 
 
38.      The following econometric specification is used to analyze the impact of an 
external funding shock on domestic credit: 
∆ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݈݅ܿ݁݊݀݅݊ ௜݃௧ ൌן௜൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛ∆݁ݔݐ݈ܾ݅ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߜݐ݅݉݁݀ݑ݉௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧…. (1) 
Where i=1… N refers to the number of banks in the sample and t=1…T refers to time. The 
main dependant variable is the change in loans to domestic residents (these are constructed 
as the sum of bank lending to households and to companies). The explanatory variables 
include the change in external liabilities, which is the main variable of interest to test the 
transmission of the external funding shock. The bank-specific control variables include the 
size of a bank calculated as the log of total assets, liquidity of bank’s assets calculated as 
cash plus securities scaled by total assets, and the share of funding from deposits is 
calculated as deposits divided by total liabilities. The priors are that banks that are larger, 
more liquid and have a more stable source of funding are likely to cut lending by less when 
faced with an external funding shock. It can be argued that larger banks encounter smaller 
informational asymmetries than smaller banks, and more liquid and better capitalized banks 
are able to marshal their resources to maintain lending when faced with a funding shock. 
The above regression includes bank-specific fixed effects. Also included are time dummies 
to control for the business cycle and economic policies, including the effect of changes in 
monetary policy, changes in regulation or government interventions, or changes in 
supervision. The time dummies also represent another way to capture any changes in loan 
demand effects through time. Reflecting the difference in business models, we estimate the 
regression separately for domestic banks and foreign bank branches. 
(%) Pre-crisis growth rate Crisis growth rate Pre-crisis growth rate Crisis growth rate
Loans to companies 37.47 10.32 29.43 -4.81
Loans to households 17.33 4.08 4.13 -0.68
Deposits 19.44 6.89 68.23 -12.33
Borrowings 13.58 3.63 82.5 -15.65
External liabilities 83.07 -21.78 226.74 -23.14
Bonds 55.68 9.88 - -
Table 4. Summary Statistics: Domestic Banks and Foreign Bank Branches
Sources: Bank of Korea; and IMF staff calculations.
Domestic Banks FBBs
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39.      The estimation is confronted with two issues: potential endogeneity and 
disentangling loan demand from loan supply. This paper disentangles the portion of the 
observed lending slowdown that emanates from reduced loan supply, as opposed to loan 
demand. It is entirely conceivable that during the crisis, new loans dried up as economy 
activity slowed rapidly leading to reduced demand for credit, and therefore a decline in the 
ex post observed loans. Therefore, to establish the operation of a bank lending channel, the 
identification of a lending supply shock is critical by isolating loan demand shocks. 
Secondly, the relationship between domestic credit and foreign banking flows can in 
principle run in both directions. Reduced foreign inflows can lead to a decline in domestic 
credit, but it is also possible that anemic economic activity and bank credit may attract 
fewer inflows. This potential endogenity may mean that the regressors could be correlated 
with the error term. To circumvent these issues, we estimate the panel regression by using 
dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) using the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimator to ensure consistency of the estimates.   
40.      We test for changes in this relationship during the global financial crisis. The next 
specification introduces a crisis dummy C, which takes the value of one during the period 
2008Q1–09Q1. The external liabilities variable is interacted with the crisis dummy to 
gauge whether the coefficient changes during the crisis period. We estimate the following 
equation: 
∆ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݈݅ܿ݁݊݀݅݊ ௜݃௧ ൌן௜൅ ߚ ௜ܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ሺߛ௖ כ ܥ ൅ ߛሻ∆݁ݔݐ݈ܾ݅ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߜݐ݅݉݁݀ݑ݉௧ ൅ߝ௜௧….(2) 
41.      The results of the whole sample regression are summarized in Table 5. Given the 
different business models for domestic banks and foreign bank branches, we run these 
regressions separately. Columns 1 and 2 contain the regressions for domestic banks using 
fixed effects and dynamic GMM estimation, respectively. The finding is that size and a 
greater reliance on a deposit base are all positively associated with domestic lending. 
Furthermore, an increase in external liabilities is significantly associated with an increase 
in lending by domestic banks, although the magnitude is small. A 1 percent increase in 
external funding leads to a 0.01 percent increase in domestic lending using fixed effects. 
However, using dynamic GMM estimation for domestic banks, the coefficient on external 
liabilities is insignificant. Columns 3 and 4 show the regressions for foreign bank branches 
using fixed effects and dynamic GMM, respectively. As expected, the domestic lending by 
foreign bank branches is not sensitive to bank specific characteristics. Indeed, foreign 
bank branches are not very active in retail banking and focus on providing foreign 
exchange liquidity to domestic banks. These relationships hold during normal times. 
42.      Next we turn to the estimation of the relationship during the crisis. As noted above, 
a crisis dummy is introduced into the panel regression and interacted with the main 
variable of interest, namely the change in external liabilities. However, the results show 
(contained in column 5) that the crisis dummy is not statistically significant. The effect on 
domestic bank credit was relatively limited due to the efforts to provide liquidity during 
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the crisis. The Bank of Korea provided banks with US dollar liquidity as well as Korean 
won liquidity when necessary, and allowed banks to adjust themselves in the face of 
financial crisis. As noted in Aiyar and Jain-Chandra (2012 a and b), in Asia, a stronger 
policy response and healthier balance sheets of local banks led to a smaller credit supply 
impact of foreign bank deleveraging. 
43.      The transmission of external liabilities to domestic credit supply was relatively 
limited as the above regression results show.  Since the Asian financial crisis in late 1990s, 
Korean banks have strived to improve their balance sheets by matching funding currencies 
with operating currencies to solve the currency mismatch problem. This means that banks 
rarely use funds directly converted from foreign currency borrowing to extend domestic 
credit. Accordingly, the direct impact of changes in foreign currency borrowing upon 
domestic banks’ credit supply has much lessened. This leads to very weak correlation 
between changes in banks’ external liabilities and domestic credit supply as the regression 
results show. 
Table 5. Panel Regression Results 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5
Fixed 
effects
Arellano-
Bond
Fixed effects
Arellano-
Bond
Fixed 
effects
(Domestic 
banks)
(Domestic 
banks)
(Foreign 
branches)
(Foreign 
branches)
(Domestic 
banks)
0.0068*** 0.0053 0.0119 0.0270 0.00622)
(0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0581) (0.0826) (0.0040)
-0.2696* -0.5388* -0.5679 -0.2889 -0.2708*
(0.0645) (0.1150) (0.4271) (0.7349) (0.0646)
 0.4448*  0.7460* -0.1666 -0.2054 0.4431*
(0.0334) (0.0353) (0.1669) (0.2520) (0.0336)
 0.3534*  0.6808* 0.3252 0.5442 0.3499*
(0.0593) (0.0769) (0.8060) (1.3167) (0.0597)
ΔDC (L1) - -0.1121* - -0.4647* -
(0.0321) (0.0549)
0.0078
(0.0149)
N of obs 648 324 755 371 648
R-sq 
(within)
0.7729 - 0.0424 - 0.7730
Notes: 
2) P-value = 11.6% (The crisis period defined as 2008 Q2 ~ 2009 Q1)
1) *, **, and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
No No No No
Dependent 
variable : Δ 
Domestic 
Credit
Δ External 
Liabilities
Δ Liquidity
Δ Size
Δ Deposits
With crisis 
interaction
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V.   CONCLUSION 
44.      Korea was hit very hard by the 2008 global financial crisis, with the foreign bank 
deleveraging channel coming prominently into play. The intensification of the euro area 
crisis in the second half of 2011 also led to significant deleveraging of Korean assets by 
European banks. Korea was hit hard along with other Asian economies, though the 
retrenchment was more modest than during the global financial crisis, commensurate with 
the size of the shock. Although the euro area banks’ exposure to Korea has substantially 
diminished, Korea may be vulnerable to sudden foreign bank deleveraging resulting from 
a further escalation of the crisis, as outstanding claims of European banks vis-à-vis Korea 
remain sizeable compared with other Asian countries. Furthermore, a significant 
worsening of the crisis and the accompanying deleveraging is unlikely to be confined to 
European banks alone and is likely to spillover to other international banks through global 
financial markets. 
45.      The global financial crisis demonstrated that a sharp deleveraging can be 
transmitted to emerging markets through the bank lending channel to a slowdown in credit 
growth. The analysis finds that a 1 percent decline in external funding leads to a 0.01 
percent decline in domestic credit by domestic banks in Korea. The effect on the banking 
sector was limited by the efforts of the government to provide foreign currency liquidity. 
46.      Despite being vulnerable to sudden foreign bank deleveraging, Korea appears better 
prepared to handle such shocks relative to 2008.The DSGE model calibrated to Korea finds 
that the sensitivity of external variables (including net foreign assets) to a foreign bank 
deleveraging shock has become less after the global financial crisis, showing that the 
economy has become more resilient to such shocks. The increased resilience could be 
explained by a lower external debt to GDP ratio and higher foreign reserves since the crisis.  
Indeed, Korea is much better prepared to face such shocks due to the concerted efforts by 
the authorities, which has led to the strengthening of external buffers, such as higher 
foreign exchange reserves, bilateral and multilateral currency swap arrangements. At the 
same time, the adoption of macroprudential measures have reduced domestic banks’ 
reliance on short-term wholesale funding, leading to lower exposures to foreign banks.  
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